Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Functionalism, philosophy of mind: the thesis that mind states are functional states that can be described by input and output. See also identity theory, mind-body-problem, materialism, physicalism, mental states.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Lewis, David
Books on Amazon
Functionalism I 57f
Putnam’s functionalism is another (earlier) than that of Lewis. It is directed against the computer model of the mind. It believes in the idea of ​​a "program of the mind" which might be realized materially somewhere else already, e.g. in the totality of a rail system with freight transport.
I 58
Lewis: his functionalism has nothing to do with that. But according to him, it might well be that machines cannot have a mind a priori.

D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

> Counter arguments against Lewis
> Counter arguments in relation to Functionalism

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-29