Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Functionalism, philosophy of mind: the thesis that mind states are functional states that can be described by input and output. See also identity theory, mind-body-problem, materialism, physicalism, mental states.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Pauen, Michael
Books on Amazon
Functionalism V 67
Multiple realizability: a variety of neural activity can cause one and the same mental state. (E.g. -Split Brain: takeover by other areas). Problem for the identity theory and materialism
V 130
Definiton Semantic functionalism/Lewis/Pauen: reverts exclusively to everyday language behavioural vocabulary.
V 132
Functionalism/Lewis/Pauen: Vs multiple realization (if the roles are determined accurately enough.) - that distinguishes him from most other functionalists.
V 135f
Psycho-functionalism/Pauen: responds to the shortcomings of everyday language in determining mental states - "the functional description can be pushed to an individual neuron -" representative: Dennett: Vseverydaypsychology: Problem: to recognize simulation -

Pau I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001

> Counter arguments in relation to Functionalism

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-29