Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Functionalism, philosophy of mind: the thesis that mind states are functional states that can be described by input and output. See also identity theory, mind-body-problem, materialism, physicalism, mental states.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Searle, John R.
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Functionalism Dennett I 557
Function/Searle: (according to Dennett): only products that were produced by a real human consciousness, have a function (> objet ambigu, P. Valéry).
DennettVsSearle: therefore the wings of the aircraft serve to fly, but not the wings of the eagle.
I 19
SearleVsFunctionalism (SearleVsPutnam) relationships between mind states are not only causal. Otherwise stones would have the same mind states like us with the right causal relations.
I 59 ff
VsFunctionalism: eliminates qualia - imitation of a functional organization does not result in pain sensation.
I 233f
Machine is defined by effects, cannot be recreated from cheese - Computer: is syntactically defined, can be rebuild by anything (cats, mice, cheese) - Syntax is always relative to the observer. Not intrinsical - but heart is an intrinsical pump - also water is describable as intelligent (lowest resistance).
I 266F
Intentional phenomena: rule consequences: genuine causal phenomena - Functional explanation: only bare physical facts, causality only through interest-oriented description here - rules are no cause for action.
I 266
Function/Searle: has no separate layer.
I 269
Pattern: plays a causal role in functional terms, but does not guarantee unconscious representation. (Intentionality)
III 24
SearleVsMillikan: function is always relative to the observer (only "flow" immanent) - Millikan: function arose evolutionary.

J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-29