Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Thought, philosophy: a thought corresponds to a complete sentence. There is debate about whether we can attribute such thoughts to animals. See also mentalism, mental states, opacity, thinking, reality, world/thinking, propositional attitudes, propositions, intensions, objects of thought, relation theory, mentalese, computation._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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M. Dummett on Thoughts - Dictionary of Arguments
I 19 Frege: The thought not the same as sense of the sentence. - Creatures with identical thoughts without linguistic manifestation are possible. I 32 f Frege/thought: According to Frege the thought (the content of the act of thinking) is not part of the stream of consciousness. Frege: capturing the thought ismental act. - The thought is not content of consciousness - consciousness is subjective - the thought is objective. - WittgensteinVsFrege. Frege: Thoughts are objective, ideas are not. - If it were otherwise, we could never disagree. I 194 ff Thoughts/DummettVsFrege: Thoughts are not necessarily linguistic: Proto-thoughts (also animals) (associated with activities). >Animal language. - Proto-thoughts instead of Husserl's noema. I 120 A thought cannot be detected otherwise than as a complex. Evans: "generality condition": "This rose smells sweet" - no one who is unable to have other thoughts regarding this rose can have the thought or who does not understand what smelling sweet is. (Dummett pro). I 89 Grasp: does not determine the truth value, but the truth conditions. >Truth conditions. _____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 |