b) what we think of something, e.g. grass
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Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Thought, philosophy: a thought corresponds to a complete sentence. There is debate about whether we can attribute such thoughts to animals. See also mentalism, mental states, opacity, thinking, reality, world/thinking, propositional attitudes, propositions, intensions, objects of thought, relation theory, mentalese, computation.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

A. Prior on Thoughts - Dictionary of Arguments

I 3
Object of thought/Prior:
a) Ryle: "accusative of belief": the proposition
b) what we think of something, e.g. grass
c) what we think about it.
Predicate: predicares are is not "about".
>"About"
, >Predicates, >Predication, >Intentionality,
>Propositions, >Thinking, >Content.
I 130
Thinking/object/Prior: one can know very well what it means to think of X without knowing whether X exists - even a third party can know what it is, that Y thinks of X without knowing whether X exists.
>Thought objects, >Belief objects, >Non-existence, >Reference.
Dilemma:
a) thinking constitutes a relation between X and Y, but not if X does not exist.
>Relation theory.
b) thinking is the same, regardless of whether the object exists or not (Anscombe).
>E. Anscombe.
Prior: one has to be abandoned, but which one?

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19
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