Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Emotion, philosophy of mind: is usually defined by examples such as joy, fear, anger in order to distinguish it from other internal states. It is controversial whether emotions are triggered solely by external circumstances. See also sensations, perception, mental states, mind states, consciousness, stimuli, introspection, other minds.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Ryle, Gilbert
Books on Amazon
Emotions I 131
Emotion/Ryle: not the same as mood - tingling sensation = tickling, feeling sick not the same as being sick.
Mood/Ryle: not recognizing, not understanding - but open, from the heart, not the head.
I 137
Emotion/Ryle: absurd not to know if you feel better - but not absurd: not knowing whether one is healthier now.
I 137
Emotion not linked with arousal or inclination - Sensations not intentional.
I 140
Fantasy (novel) brings real suffering and real tears but spurious indignation.
Delight, relief, sorrow: sign of feelings, not the feelings themselves.
I 143 f
Emotions/sensations: itching, tingling, stinging, biting, prickling, drilling, nausea, shock, anxiety, tension - at most accidental action explanatory.
Mood: delight, joy, sorrow, longing, nostalgia, passion, excitement, disappointment (even in the absence) - also mood to like to do something (Disposition) - Mood: no experience, no object of introspection.

Ry I
G. Ryle
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-24