Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Way of givenness, manner of presentation, philosophy: expression from G. Frege for distinguishing meaning (in Frege's sense of meaning that upon which a term refers - today "reference") and the sense (in Frege's use of the term, what we today call "meaning"). The givenness depends both on the circumstances and the individual language use. Carnap introduces the concept of "intension" for the way of givenness. See also intensions, extensions, propositions, propositional attitudes, improper speech, proper speech, improper sense, proper sense, meaning, reference.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Evans, Gareth
 
Books on Amazon:
Gareth Evans
Way of Givenness Frank I 485 f.
here / Evans: no intension - "here"-thoughts are no particular manner of presentation, but represent as many places as there are.

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994


> Counter arguments against Evans



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-27