Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Way of givenness, manner of presentation, philosophy: expression from G. Frege for distinguishing meaning (in Frege's sense of meaning that upon which a term refers - today "reference") and the sense (in Frege's use of the term, what we today call "meaning"). The givenness depends both on the circumstances and the individual language use. Carnap introduces the concept of "intension" for the way of givenness. See also intensions, extensions, propositions, propositional attitudes, improper speech, proper speech, improper sense, proper sense, meaning, reference.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Schiffer, Stephen
Books on Amazon
Way of Givenness I 53
Givenness/Manner of presentation/Way of givenness/w.o.g. propositional theory/Schiffer. Variant: instead of "Henry thinks that this girl is wise" (index word) - (Em) m is a way of givenness this girl & B (Henry,) - problem: that does not tell us which proposition Henry believes, but only that he believes any - known feature in the propositional theory.
I 27
Identity/Way of presentation/w.o.g./Schiffer: Solution: you can simply accept conflicting beliefs ("dog but not shmog") - as e.g. Superman/Clark Kent (Lois Lane believes that Kent is identical with himself) - problem: then you cannot accept for natural kind concepts without even concede it at the same time also for singular term in sentences - ((s) so for everything) - Fido-Fido: explains why .. dogness .. and ... shmogness .. do not refer to the same proposition - (despite equality Extension): - because Tanya does not believe that shmogs are dogs - ((s) >arthrite/shmarthrite) - Nathan SalmonVs all: pro "Fido" = Fido.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-24