Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Object: The object in philosophy is anything that can be thought about or talked about. It can be concrete or abstract, and it is often contrasted with the subject, which is the being that is doing the thinking or talking. See also Subject, Subject-Object Problem, Objects (Material things)._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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N. Goodman on Object - Dictionary of Arguments
II 71 Possible objects: a real color or a real place do not need to occur at all times. Just as little as a human must live forever. (>real >reality). II 72 Object: not all objects have the predicate time-place, some are "total objects" (p + t), parts have no relationship to each other. Just as the parts of two cars on two sides of the street form no car (similar to Quine). >Totality, >Wholes, >Parts, >Part-of-Relation; cf. >Mereology. II 72f The predicate "time-place" applies to many objects which consist of a place and a time, but not to all, for example, not to t+p. II 73f Possible objects/Goodman: real objects form a smaller subclass of the possible objects. "Possible time-place" objects are no new real objects but it is a new predicate for old real sum objects of the form: p + t. The predicate "time-place" does not apply to p + t. Similar to "biggt" and "flexible": p + t = "time-place-able". II 74 Continuation/predicates statement: "Time-place is red": two continuations: it continues the two predicates "red" and "time-place" on p + t. The possible objects and predicates disappear. Predicates refer to reality, but have extensions that are related in a very specific way with the extensions of certain manifest predicates and are usually wider. >Possible worlds, >Predicates._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |