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Twin earth/Davidson: Subjective states do not arise as a consequence of the state of the brain or the nervous system.
False theory: the objects would be the meanings of sentences (Vs), that is, the propositions.
DavidsonVs: with this, it would be so arranged that, e.g. if a Frenchman attributed the same state of consciousness to Paul as I do, the same subject would be named by us both, whereas this would not be the case in the theory under consideration, for the sentence in question of the Frenchman would not be the same as mine. (Falsely).
It should not concern us that the Frenchman and I use different words, it is similar to ounces and carats. (> measuring)
My monism is ontological: it asserts that mental events and objects can also be described as physical.
Mind/Davidson: if we consider the subjective or mental exclusively as a consequence of the physical characteristics of a person, meanings cannot be something purely subjective or mental. (Putnam: Meanings ain't in the head).
Frank I 626
Mind/Davidson: not without language, both equal.
Frank I 657ff
Mental states/external attribution/Davidson: "narrow" state/twin earth: "inner", is solipsistic, as with Descartes. The narrow states are the same for the twin earth. - BurgeVsPutnam: they do not exist. - SearleVsPutnam: narrow states are unnecessary, ordinary propositional attitudes suffice - DavidsonVsSearle/VsBurge: ordinary mental states are narrow (internal) and at the same time "non-individualistic", i.e. externally identifiable.
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994