Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Field, Hartry
Books on Amazon
Mental States II 84
Mental states/intentionality/Stalnaker: pro pragmatic image: belief contents are coarse grained - understandable in terms of the role in the characterization of actions. - Field: pro linguistic image.
II 88
Representation/FieldVsStalnaker/Field: we should manage without intrinsically representative mental states. - non-intrinsical representational states: also have content, can be synonymous. - On the other hand intrinsically representative: E.g. object of believe as an ordered triple from Caesar, Rubicon, Cross.
II 89
Possible world/MöWe/sets of/Field: what is relevant for sets of possible worlds as objects of mental states is that they form a Boolean algebra.
II 100
Intentionality/FieldVsStalnaker: we need more than the atomistic approach that everything that satisfies a Boolean algebra is sufficient for the explanation of mental states. (Via sets of possible worlds) - Instead: we need a systematic of the connection of content. - Therefore, we need a more fine-grained structure than that of sets of possible worlds.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-29