|Objects of belief, philosophy: it is advocated by some authors that beliefs or thoughts must correspond to objects. Other authors see this as the risk of an objectification or reification. See also relation-theory, truthmakers mentalism, reification.|
Books on Amazon
|Objects of Belief||IV 134
Objects of belief/Lewis: we should attribute properties instead propositions as objects of belief - they work in more cases - Proposition: set of possible worlds - i.e. a region in the logical space - in contrast properties: set of individuals.
Attitudes/Belief/Objects of belief/Relation theory/Lewis: instead of propositions as objects of belief: - self-attribution of properties - e.g. spatial (not logical) localization: is not a proposition: E.g. I am on the 6th floor of the Stanford library - is not a property that corresponds to a proposition - E.g. Lingens has to identify himself as a member of a sub-population, whose boundaries do not coincide with the boundaries of possible worlds - with the sub-population whose sole member he is himself - propositional knowledge/Lewis: knowledge of perception: I perceive does not correspond to any proposition - reason: there are possible worlds in which someone has this perception situation and someone else ((s)the same time) does not.
Self-attribution of a property: is de se, not de dicto.
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989
Konventionen Berlin 1975
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991