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|Limits||Hintikka I 19
Limit/language/Wittgenstein is shown by the impossibility to describe a fact, without repeating the corresponding sentence - Hintikka: = thesis of linguistic relativity.
The relationship between name and object cannot be expressed in language - not even the concept of existence - only presentable by the use of the name.
Limit/language/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: important: inner limit: the ability of what can be expressed in language about the language. - E.g. When I say that language can be extended, I must say what I mean.
Limit/world/object/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the world as the whole of objects and the with that given limit would be inconceivable, if not also relations would belong to the objects.
Limit/language/Wittgenstein: E.g. expectation, fulfillment must have a shared expression - e.g. "red" must occur in the appropriate sentences. Limit/expression: this shared can in turn not be described by a sentence.
A symbolism cannot explain itself. - Only by another symbolism - a single symbol can be explained, but only by another symbol. - (> Regress).
Logic/limit/Wittgenstein/Schulte: the logic will not be given a limit through the use of the language, of course. - It is, so to speak, the common framework of my and your language.
Tetens VII 78
Limit/image theory/picture theory/Tractatus/Tetens: Problem: a picture cannot display its form of image. (2,172) - Problem: for this it would have to be outside its form of presentation. (2174)) - this also applies to sentences - sentence: cannot represent what he has in common with reality - or he would have to set up himself outside the logic.
Language/Limit/Tractatus/Tetens: with sentences about the language, we end up with "meta-levelled" tautologies - E.g. instances of the Talski-schema. - (E.g. ((s) meaning postulates that are uninformative).
Logic/existence/Tractatus/Tetens: but the logic cannot tell what the case is, otherwise it would exclude options. - ((s) so the logic would have to exclude logical possibilities). (See 5.61).
Subject/limit/world/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Tetens: Although self-reflection is possible, I always add something what I cannot catch up with: the way in which I think at the moment about the world. - Therefore, I exist as a subject in the world not like the objects - with a thought about the world I still win a property additionally.
Accuracy of solipsism: does not show itself in the content, but in the completion of the higher-level thought.
Subject: shrinks to what the thought has - but not as part of the content of thought.
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994
Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009