Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Haecceitism: the thesis that an object can be fixed by the identification as "this here" to allow further assertions on this subject to be stated. E.g. To claim that in a different world, this object is different. See also identification, identity, logical proper names, anti-haecceitism, index words, > indexicality, individuation, dthat, rigidity, possible worlds._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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R. Chisholm on Haecceitism - Dictionary of Arguments
I 33f Haeccetism/Haeccitas/Chisholm: assumes a property "to be identical with me", the "this-ness" - comes from Frege/Husserl: everyone has his own idea of himself. ChisholmVsHaeccetism: no list of properties is possible. >Ontology, >Properties. I 36 Not each individual must have a detectable individual essence. Frank I 252 Haeccetism/ChisholmVsHaeccetist attributes: there aint. E.g. "Same as Quine", "the same as me "," the same as this". - ((s) > Corresponding to: "so" is not purely denotating: e.g." ...was so called because of his size"). Hector-Neri Castaneda (1989): Self-Consciousness, I-Structures and Physiology, in: Manfred Spitzer/Brendan A. Maher (eds.) (1989): Philosophy and Psychopathology, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1989, 118-145_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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> Counter arguments against Chisholm
> Counter arguments in relation to Haecceitism
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19