Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Rabbit-duck-head: Example of a form which can be perceived in different ways and thus allows different interpretations. According to Wittgenstein this leads to a distinction between the mental image that has the property of ambiguity and the physical image that does not have this property. (H. Putnam, Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, (German) Frankfurt 1993 p. 178f). See also ambiguity, perspective, seeing, seeing-as, knowledge, perception, sensations._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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D. Lewis on Rabbit-Duck-Head - Dictionary of Arguments
V 274 Perception/view/match/Lewis: does not mean that in your mind or the soul the same is going on as is goning on before the eyes - rather it is about a informational content. - Visual experience: is best characterized by the typical >causal role. - The >content is the content of belief, which tends to be caused by it. - Problem: the same visual experience can produce very different beliefs - but not the entire content can be characterized by belief. - Rabbit-Duck-Head: the belief can be characterized by the disjunction rabbit or duck, but then it results in the belief that there are ink and paper._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
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> Counter arguments against Lewis
> Counter arguments in relation to Rabbit-Duck-Head
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19