Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Rabbit-duck-head: Example of a form which can be perceived in different ways and thus allows different interpretations. According to Wittgenstein this leads to a distinction between the mental image that has the property of ambiguity and the physical image that does not have this property. (H. Putnam, Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, (German) Frankfurt 1993 p. 178f). See also ambiguity, perspective, seeing, seeing-as, knowledge, perception, sensations.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Searle, John R.
 
Books on Amazon
Rabbit-Duck-Head II 76
Rabbit-Duck Head: Wittgenstein: different use of the word "to see" - SearleVsWittgenstein: we see not only objects but also aspects - that we love people, but also aspects.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-29