Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Rabbit-duck-head: Example of a form which can be perceived in different ways and thus allows different interpretations. According to Wittgenstein this leads to a distinction between the mental image that has the property of ambiguity and the physical image that does not have this property. (H. Putnam, Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, (German) Frankfurt 1993 p. 178f). See also ambiguity, perspective, seeing, seeing-as, knowledge, perception, sensations._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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J.R. Searle on Rabbit-Duck-Head - Dictionary of Arguments
II 76 Rabbit-Duck Head: In the case of the Rabbit-Duck Head, we would like to say that the intentional object is the same. We have two visual experiences with two different presentational contents, but only one image. >Representation, >Internal representation. Rabbit-Duck-Head: Wittgenstein: the rabbit-duck-head shows different uses of the word "to see". SearleVsWittgenstein: we see not only objects but also aspects. We love people, but also aspects. >Aspects/Searle._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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> Counter arguments against Searle
> Counter arguments in relation to Rabbit-Duck-Head
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18