Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Rabbit-duck-head: Example of a form which can be perceived in different ways and thus allows different interpretations. According to Wittgenstein this leads to a distinction between the mental image that has the property of ambiguity and the physical image that does not have this property. (H. Putnam, Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, (German) Frankfurt 1993 p. 178f). See also ambiguity, perspective, seeing, seeing-as, knowledge, perception, sensations.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Wittgenstein, Ludwig
 
Books on Amazon
Rabbit-Duck-Head VI 205
Rabbit-duck-illusion/seeing of aspects/Wittgenstein/Schulte: even with a picture puzzle we "see" always the same - but probably also different ways - > interpretation. > action - seeing, not an act but a condition - introspection does not help change the shape.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-24