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|Holism||Rorty I 289
DummettVsDavidson/Rorty: VsHolism: you cannot provide adequate philosophy of language without the two Kantian distinctions (fact/interpretation and necessity/contingency)
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HolismVs distinction sense/reference, extreme holism: Basic Doctrine: meaning changes constantly - theory: believing-to-be-true - new sentences change language behavior (approval and rejection of other sentences) - later no identification of the new sentences anymore. - Extreme holism: Basic Doctrine: no concept of meaning, the concept of change in meaning useless - DummettVsHolism: our presentation would depend on where we happen to begin - still: determine dispositions only after believing-to-be-true - (first truth, then meaning.) - In every theory, new judgements change the dispositions, therefore dispositions are not determinant for the meaning! - It is wrong to think a sentence has no inherent meaning. - Theory: it is about new judgments, not new meanings.
Extreme Holism says, from the quantity of sentences believed to be true (without knowledge about the causal circumstances) future dispositions could be derived.- Vs: that is impossible.
Holism/Deception/Dummett: has no criterion for specific speaker meaning in a particular case - only the tendency of believing-to-be-true - hence we have no concept of error.
Holism believes meaning theory to be impossible. - Dummett: maybe he is right.
Holism/DummettVsHolism: Problem: the set of all true sentences must then not contain any index-linked characteristics - HolismVs: solution: could propose instead a set of index-linked judgments. - DummettVsVs: then no speaker knows the meaning theory.
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