Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Fodor, Jerry
Books on Amazon
Holism IV 41/42
Holism/Science/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: if the network metaphor is correct, then there is nothing transtheoretical- Vs: but this is needed for the public nature of the observation.
IV 49
Conceptual holism/Fodor/Lepore: Assumptions about the necessary relationships between concepts have no psychological consequences. - E.g. Cat/Animal requires nothing for the actual use or for learning. - (Vsconceptual holism)
IV 127f
Holism/Fodor/Lepore: functional analysis of the belief can make it holistic - but that does not imply conceptual holism, because belief is not a basic concept, but a representation - Thesis: belief holism is secured - conceptual holism is not!.
IV 129/130
Holism/Fodor/Lepore: intentionality: does not lead to holism (propositional attitudes are not holistic qua intentionality, their semantic properties depend on things which only God knows). - Functionalism: leads to holism - Fodor/LeporeVs: no, because there is no analytic-synthetic distinction.
IV 179
Inferential role/Fodor/Lepore: originally, its attractiveness as a causal role consisted in providing a basis for the solution of Brentano s problem of irreducibility to Neurophysiology. (>Computation).
IV 180
Fodor/Lepore: either one represents the semantics of conceptual role or one is a holist.

J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

> Counter arguments against Fodor
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-29