Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Kripke, Saul Aaron
Books on Amazon
Homophony EMD II 338
Homophone Truth Theory: "Snow is white" is true iff. snow is white: metalanguage (m.l.) contains the object language (o.l.) - alternative: canonical translation of meta language to object language - Kripke: in general we let the truth theory itself determine the translation of the object language into the meta language (but not always: more than one formula f can fulfill all criteria).
EMD II 338
Homophony/Homophone Truth Theory/Kripke: Occurs when the metalanguage contains the object language. - "Snow is white"/snow is white).
II 344
The truth theories of Sections 1 and 2 are non-homophone - Section 5: homophone.
II 346
Homophone Truth Theory: one that provides the consequences of the form T(f) biconditional f - non-homophone truth theory: here we may request an f in the metalanguage at most for each f - this is often more useful than a homophone: is only useful when the object language is already understood - non-homophone sufficient for someone’s intuition who does not have the concept yet, but already understands what the truth is in L0. He also needs to know the concept of chaining and the referential quantification about expressions. - Then he can give the truth conditions of the poorly understood language in the language he understands. E.g. a Frenchman can give French truth conditions for German that he does not understand well.
II 358
Homophony: Can be made quite mechanically from a non-homophone truth theory - 1) The metalanguage is expanded so that it contains the object language - 2) all findings of the form f biconditional f are added to the old axioms, while f is from the object language and f is its translation into the metalanguage - then, since T(f) biconditional f followed from the old axioms, it follows also from the new ones - that violates Davidson’s claim of the finite axiomatization of truth theory! There are now infinitely many axioms of the form f bicond. f. - But there is only a finite number that include T - this excludes a trivial truth theory.
EMD II 357
Homophone Truth Theory/Kripke: does not provide T(f) biconditional f alone - ((s) the truth of the representing is equivalent to the represented). - (DavidsonVs) - ((s) the representing can be a very different chain of characters.) - E.g. Kripke: not T((x1)(x1 bold) biconditional (x1)(x1 bold), but T((x1)(x1 bold) biconditional there is a sequence s such that each sequence s that differs from s at most in the first position, has a bold first element - Problem: how do you decide which sentences show the correct structure - f is not determined here - it differs in any case in the structure and ontology of f - the truth theory does not uncover the structure.

S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984

G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

> Counter arguments against Kripke

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-30