|Chisholm, Roderick M.
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|I, Ego, Self||I 23
I/Chisholm: Being oneself is not a property. - from this follows: false: "x has necessarily the property to be identical with x" - instead: "for every x applies necessarily ..." - there is no property "to be identical with x".
I/Anscombe: the thing from whose action this idea of an action is an idea, etc. - ChisholmVsAnscombe: explains I by demonstrativum.
I/CastanedaVsChisholm: pro propositions of the first person as concrete things with finite existence - never possible to express or capture foreign I-propositions.
I/Self/Chisholm: it is not certain that each person can comprehend their own individual nature - emphatic reflexive:/Chisholm: "he himself" - the non-emphatic are a special case of the emphatic - E.g. it does not matter whether the engine controls the enginge, or the engine controls itself - in this case no non-emphatic reflexives are possible - but difference: whether the doctor treats the doctor or the doctor treats himself - difference whether psychological or nonpsychological predicates are applicable - if at all psychological ones are possible, then not understanding the "he-himself" expression as a special case of the ordinary expression de re, but vice versa.
I/Russell/Chisholm: the biography to which this belongs - now: the time of this - here: the place of this - now/Chisholm: does not pick out an identifiable property, which should that be? - to express that the present is the only existing time, one needs "now" or a synonym - time: conjunction of events or facts.
I/ChisholmVsAnscombe: tries to explain their use of "I" by their use of "this" ("I am this thing") - Vs: but with this she cannot explain my use of "I" - ChisholmVsAnscombe: we need no demonstrativa (like Brentano: no identifying properties).
"We are F"/Chisholm: not always conjunction "I am F and you are F".
I/property/Chisholm: even if I do not have an individual nature, some of my properties are essential to me: perhaps my being-a-person.
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004