Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
McGinn, Colin
Books on Amazon
I, Ego, Self I 79 f
I/McGinn: can be understood as that which gives unity to the states of consciousness.
Question: What is the nature of this unit, by what get my states of consciousness mine and yours yours?
The philosophical problem is that we cannot specify what is actually a self.
I 81f
I/self/McGinn: is excluded from the area of uncomplicated space filling by the close relationship with the consciousness. Through that the relationship with the body gets problematic.
Self/I/McGinn: we do not have sensibility, with respect to which the selves (immediately) present themselves separately from each other. E.g. I can see that your body is different from the other, but I cannot see in the same way that you are different from it. Confidence/I/McGinn: another difficulty: the I is also systematically transcendent in the acts of self-consciousness. The thinking instance acts as a subject and can never merely be the object. So even if the reflective I and the reflected I are the same, I can never resign.
But just in my being a subject is my nature.
There is also no guarantee that the subject retains its essential characteristics, when it turns into the object.
... Therefore we cannot perceive it as something that belongs to the same area as the (mereological) sum of the parts of the body, as if it was composed in an understandable way of the same material as the body. (CALM: Combinatorial atomism with lawlike mappings).
I 96f
I/McGinn: The I is not composed of its mental states. In some way the I transcended its own mental states.
But then there must be something that triggers this ontological transition.
So instructions must be encoded in the genes for the production of I from living cell tissue.
It may be that our concept of the person is an indefinable analytical basic concept, but the things themselves need something like an inner natural structure and a construction method.
Because there can be no difference in terms of person-likeness, which would not be based on physical difference .
I 104
I/consciousness/Intention/McGinn: are inextricably linked to a formidable tradition. The Self is seen as the origin of intention, the states of consciousness as the main vehicles of intention. McGinnVsTradition: but to realize that correlations exist, you do not have to accept an indissoluble link.
II 181
I/self/McGinn: E.g. Assuming aliens change our nature and turn us into sofa stools, to which the planet does not matter. We only have a preference for soap operas. Question: Can we be sure, that we are still ourselves? Did the aliens not simply replace you by themselves? Question: When is a cluster of cells an I?

C. McGinn
Die Grenzen vern├╝nftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

C. McGinn
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? M├╝nchen 2001

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-26