Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Nagel, Thomas
Books on Amazon
I, Ego, Self Frank I 506ff
I/Nagel: identification of an objective person as myself; adds no fact to the world - therefore, such identity statements are not understandable for us! - E.g. whether I imagine that my house burns down and I am present or not makes no difference to what one imagines as being the case - EvansVs: an identity statement does not need to make a difference for a spatiotemporal map of the world, but for the manner in which the immediate environment is considered
Nagel III 31
I/objectivism/Nagel: problem of a liberal realist worldview, everyone must admit to themselves that they are a person in a center-less world who is no one else but themselves -
III 33
Distinction I/person/Nagel: allows to ask: how can I be this specific person? - What kind of fact is that? - Problem in the center-less world - Solution: "objective self" which we identify with the "I" - the "self" has the ability to form an idea about the person in the world - in doing so, it refrains from the standpoint of "I am" - the real self excludes the contingent person Thomas Nagel and his perspective as content in its worldview

Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-26