Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Stalnaker, Robert
Books on Amazon
I, Ego, Self I 20/21
I/objective self/Nagel/Stalnaker: I: when someone says I’m RS it seems that the person represents a fact - I 21 and it is an objective fact, whether this is true or false - no matter what the speaker thinks. - Problem: our concept of an objective world seems to leave no room for such a fact. - A complete description of the world as it is in itself will not pick out any particular person as me - it does not tell me who I am! - Semantic diagnosis: attempts a representation of index words or self-localization - NagelVssemantic diagnosis: this does not hit the mark - StalnakerVsVs: simply homophonic truth condition. - Problem: what is the content? - The content (information) in indexical expressions is not transported by the truth conditions - the speaker might not have known the date and place and yet have believed what he said - the listener as well, and yet have understood the expression. - Nagel: anyway Vs ontological self-objectification.

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-28