Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Strawson, Peter F.
 
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I, Ego, Self I 123
Doctrine of non-possessing/I/self/consciousness/Strawson: (probably not Wittgenstein's position/StrawsonVs): Representative: "OP" (our philosopher): Descartes: the uniqueness of a body should be sufficient to evoke the idea that the experience is attributed to it - it was just unfortunatly expressed in terms of possessing - Our PhilosopherVsDescartes: then it would be inadmissible, to assume an "ego" additionally, whose sole function of this is "possessing" - difference: body has experience causally, contingently.
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I 124
"Ego" has them necessarily, conceptually (wrong) - Solution/Our Philosopher: only things whose possession is logically transferable, can ever be possessed - experiences are then no ownership of the subject - StrawsonVsOur Philosopher: is using himself the false possession term.
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I125
Actually our experience in this particular sense are our own, and only identifiable by that - StrawsonVsDescartes/VsOur Philosopher: there are not two uses of "I".
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I 126
From particular experience of the subject arises not the necessity of a self-concept.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik M√ľnchen 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-31