Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Idealism: A) Idealism is the view that there are external things, but they are not directly recognizable. B) Idealism is a name for a philosophical direction that arose at the end of the 18th century, to which inter alia belonged the philosophers I. Kant, J.G. Fichte, G.W.F. Hegel, and F.W.J. Schelling._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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M. Dummett on Idealism - Dictionary of Arguments
I 56 IdealismVsSkepticism: assumptions about the external world are anyway false. I 55ff Idealism/Husserl/DummettVsHusserl: Husserl's assertion that the slide into idealism is prevented by the distinction between noema and object is not at all plausible. We cannot say that the subject perceives the object only indirectly, since the object is mediated by the noema. Kant and Frege are of the same opinion that every object must be given to us in a certain way. But that is why we cannot speak of indirect givenness, because the idea that an object is given, but not in a certain way, is incoherent in their view. There is nothing that can be called indirect, unless something more direct is at least conceivable. This raises the sceptical question of whether an object is there at all, if every act of consciousness has its own noema, without an external object having to be there. >Noema/Dummett, >Noema/Husserl. Dummett: Since it is an essential characteristic of Noema to be apparently directed at such an object, we have no choice but to take the view that we perceive just such an object, except in cases where we have indications to the contrary. Therefore, whenever we perceive a real object, the statement that such an object exists is justified. I 56 Dummett: The skeptic is up to this argument: he can ask how we know that we know. Idealism: From Husserl's point of view, of course, it would not be so easy to give the sceptic the idealist's answer, which is that one makes the doubts one's own, but declares them inappropriate, since what they question is untrue from the outset anyway._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19