Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Identification: A) Identification is the equivalence of two characterizations of an object in which new properties may be attributed to the object. B) Identification is the discovery that an object is a particular element from a set of objects. In this case, the number of initially assumed properties of the object may be reduced. See also specification, background, information._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
J.R. Searle on Identification - Dictionary of Arguments
II 315f Identification/Individuation/Searle: the identification of a perceived object is always "the (possibly reversed) spot, which causes this experience" (self-reference). This is not circular but the best-case identification. >Causation. --- V 141 Reference/identification/Searle: e.g. a dog only barks in the presence of his master. E.g. signal lamp: both do not refer to anything, but can be used for identification. No identification is possible in: "the only man with 8232 hairs on his head". V 143 Reference is always based on the facts the speaker knows about the obejects. V 175 Meaning/identification/Frege: a proper name means an object, a predicate means a term. Strawson: neutral: a subject identifies a >singular term. A predicate identifies a >general term. Strawson: between singular term and general term is a non-relational connection. --- V 177f Identification/object/predicate/universal/Strawson: object: identification is done by facts about the object. This works differently for predicates: at the most: "the rose and the book have the same color": but that does not identify the color. Searle: that is why >universals are identified by meaning and not by facts._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
||
> Counter arguments against Searle
> Counter arguments in relation to Identification
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20