|Strawson, Peter F.
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Identification/Strawson: if directly due to localization then without mentioning of other particulars - E.g. death depends on living things - e.g. but flash not from something flashing.
Identification/Strawson: observable particulars can also be identified without mentioning their causes or the things on which they depend, - conceptual dependency does not matter - but one cannot always identify births without identifying them as the birth of a living being.
Asymmetry: we do not need necessarily a term in language for births as particulars - but for living beings, because we are living beings ourselves.
Identifiability/particular/Strawson: minimum condition: they must be neither private nor unobservable.
Identificaion/Strawson: we cannot talk about private things when we cannot talk about public things.
Identification/StrawsonVsLeibniz: identification requires a demonstrative element: that contradicts Leibniz monads for which there should be descriptions alone in general term - Then, according to Leibniz, identification (individuation) is only possible for God: the "complete term" of an individual - that is at the same time a description of the entire universe (from a certain point, which guarantees the uniqueness).
Identification/Universal/names/particulars/Strawson: speaker/listener each must know a distinctive fact about Socrates. - But it must not be the same - E.g. "That man there can lead you" - crucial: that someone stands there - N.B.: no part introduces a single thing, but the statement as a whole presents it -> "incompleteness".
Identification/reference/Strawson: E.g. "That man there has crossed the channel by swimming through it twice" - it has the (wrong!) appearances, that one "refers twice", a) once by stating nothing and consequently making no statement, or b ) identifying the person with oneself and finding a trivial identity. StrawsonVs: this is the same error as to believe that the object would be the meaning of the expression. - E.g. "Scott is Scott".
Tugendhat I 400-403
Identification/Strawson: a) Showing - b) Description, spacetime points - TugendhatVsStrawson: because he had accepted Russell's theory of direct relation unconsciously, he did not see that there are no two orders - Tugendhat like Brandom: demonstrative identification presupposes the spatiotemporal, non-demonstrative - (deixis presupposes anaphora) - difference: specification/Tugendhat: "which of them all?" - Identification: only kind: by spacetime points.
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992