Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Strawson, Peter F.
 
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Identification I 57
Identification/Strawson: if directly due to localization then without mentioning of other particulars - E.g. death depends on living things - e.g. but flash not from something flashing.
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I 64
Identification/Strawson: observable particulars can also be identified without mentioning their causes or the things on which they depend, - conceptual dependency does not matter - but one cannot always identify births without identifying them as the birth of a living being.
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I 65
Asymmetry: we do not need necessarily a term in language for births as particulars - but for living beings, because we are living beings ourselves.
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I 66
Identifiability/particular/Strawson: minimum condition: they must be neither private nor unobservable.
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I 87
Identificaion/Strawson: we cannot talk about private things when we cannot talk about public things.
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I 153
Identification/StrawsonVsLeibniz: identification requires a demonstrative element: that contradicts Leibniz monads for which there should be descriptions alone in general term - Then, according to Leibniz, identification (individuation) is only possible for God: the "complete term" of an individual - that is at the same time a description of the entire universe (from a certain point, which guarantees the uniqueness).
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I 245
Identification/Universal/names/particulars/Strawson: speaker/listener each must know a distinctive fact about Socrates. - But it must not be the same - E.g. "That man there can lead you" - crucial: that someone stands there - N.B.: no part introduces a single thing, but the statement as a whole presents it -> "incompleteness".
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VII 124
Identification/reference/Strawson: E.g. "That man there has crossed the channel by swimming through it twice" - it has the (wrong!) appearances, that one "refers twice", a) once by stating nothing and consequently making no statement, or b ) identifying the person with oneself and finding a trivial identity. StrawsonVs: this is the same error as to believe that the object would be the meaning of the expression. - E.g. "Scott is Scott".
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Tugendhat I 400-403
Identification/Strawson: a) Showing - b) Description, spacetime points - TugendhatVsStrawson: because he had accepted Russell's theory of direct relation unconsciously, he did not see that there are no two orders - Tugendhat like Brandom: demonstrative identification presupposes the spatiotemporal, non-demonstrative - (deixis presupposes anaphora) - difference: specification/Tugendhat: "which of them all?" - Identification: only kind: by spacetime points.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-30