Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Identity: Two objects are never identical. Identity is a single object, to which may be referred to with two different terms. The fact that two descriptions mean a single object may be discovered only in the course of an investigation._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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R. Chisholm on Identity - Dictionary of Arguments
I 37 Identity/Anscombe: difference: e.g. Descartes doubts the identity with Descartes/with Descartes himself. >He/He himself. It is something different for Descartes to doubt the identity of Descartes with Descartes, than the identity of his own with Descartes. -> S. Kripke in: M.Frank, Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Frankfurt/M. 1994, p. 125. Anscombe: then it is possible that one does not know that he speaks of himself. E.g. The tallest man may not know that he is the tallest man. I 69 Identity/I/Chisholm: results from direct attribution; if x directly assigns something to y, then x is identical with y. Everyone has privileged access - but we do not explain it by the use of I, but vice versa: the use of the pronoun by direct attribution. - primary use of I am: someone says of himself that he himself ... - pronoun: does not express any part of the content. >Attribution._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18