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|Identity||Dav II 69
E.g. identity: How clear is the idea that the ancient Greeks - some ancient Greeks - believed the earth was flat? This earth? If anyone believes nothing of what we believe about the earth, to what extent does it refer to the earth?
This makes it clear that beliefs must be thought of in a similarly networked way as sentences. Beliefs - like sentences - never occur individually.
Dav I 21
Identity/Quine: we cannot pick out "the" relationship which is constitutive for the recognition of the identity of an object - any property can be regarded as relevant - Davidson: if the mind always had to establish a clear relation to the object, thinking would be impossible.
Frank I 672
Identity/Davidson: "molecular identical", "tie identical": For example, the same skin redness can be a sunburn on one hand, and something quite different on the other - even twin earth twins are molecule-identical.
DavidsonVsPutnam: but not psychically identical (Anomal monism).
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994