Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Davidson, Donald
Books on Amazon
Identity Dav II 69
E.g. identity: How clear is the idea that the ancient Greeks - some ancient Greeks - believed the earth was flat? This earth? If anyone believes nothing of what we believe about the earth, to what extent does it refer to the earth?
II 72
This makes it clear that beliefs must be thought of in a similarly networked way as sentences. Beliefs - like sentences - never occur individually.
Dav I 21
Identity/Quine: we cannot pick out "the" relationship which is constitutive for the recognition of the identity of an object - any property can be regarded as relevant - Davidson: if the mind always had to establish a clear relation to the object, thinking would be impossible.
Frank I 672
Identity/Davidson: "molecular identical", "tie identical": For example, the same skin redness can be a sunburn on one hand, and something quite different on the other - even twin earth twins are molecule-identical.
I, 674
DavidsonVsPutnam: but not psychically identical (Anomal monism).

D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

> Counter arguments against Davidson
> Counter arguments in relation to Identity

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-28