Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Identity: Two objects are never identical. Identity is a single object, to which may be referred to with two different terms. The fact that two descriptions mean a single object may be discovered only in the course of an investigation._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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P. Simons on Identity - Dictionary of Arguments
Chisholm II 171 Identity/Simons: thesis: differentiated objects may well have all parts in common: e.g. I and my body (ChisholmVs). >Parts, >Part-of-relation. --- Simons I 113 Identity/individual/whole/part/whole/extensional mereology/RescherVsExtensionality: (Rescher 1955): the extensional property that involves that wholes are identical if they have the same parts, excludes those part-whole relations, in which the organization ((s) internal structure) is involved, e.g. different sentences can consist of the same sentences, e.g. two "I's", and must not be identical if they have the same parts. E.g. a building committee equals a personnel committee, e.g. family Robinso equals the basketball team Robinson, e.g. a person/its body. N.B.: this is not about relations among themselves. >Mereology._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19