## Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments | |||

Author | Item | Excerpt | Meta data |
---|---|---|---|

Stalnaker, Robert Books on Amazon |
Identity | I 14 Vague identity/Stalnaker: can at most occur with vague terms at identity-statements - solution/counterpart theory/c.t./Stalnaker: if cross-wordly-relation between classes of deputies ((s) counterparts) exists and not between individuals themselves, then the relation must not be the one of identity, and this other relation may be vague.) --- I 126 Contingent identity/Stalnaker: it is of course not that the actualism requires contingent identity, the above examples can be explained away - one cannot simply reject the possibility on the basis of semantics and logic of identity - necessary identity: that means, that the thesis that all identity is necessary is a metaphysical thesis. --- I 131 Identity/necessary/contingent/Stalnaker: after modal quantifier theory all identity is necessary. - We do not want this - e.g. a thing can have more counterparts in another possible world. --- I 132 Solution: different ways of picking. --- I 133 Vague identity/Stalnaker/Nathan SalmonVs vague identity: (Salmon 1981, 243) according to him identity cannot be vague: E.g. Suppose there is a pair of entities x and y so that it is vague if they are one and the same thing - then this pair is certainly not the same pair like the pair, in which this is definitely true that x is the same thing as itself - but it is not vague, if the two pairs are identical or differentiated. --- I 134 Vague identity/Identity-statement/vague objects/Stalnaker: E.g. M is a specific piece of land within the indeterminate Mt Rainier - a) Mt. Rainier is an indefinite object: then it is wrong to say that M = Mt. Rainier - b ) if it is about a statement instead of an object: then indeterminate. --- I 135f Vague identity/Stalnaker: E.g. two fish restaurants Bookbinder's - only one can be the same as the original - Endurantism: Problem: "B0": (the original) is then an ambiguous term - Perdurantism: here it is clear. --- I 138 Vague identity/SalmonVs vague identity/uncertainty/Stalnaker: Salmon's argument shows that if we manage to pick out two entities a and b that there then has to be a fact, whether the two are one thing or two. (Stalnaker pro Salmon, Nathan) - conversely: if it is undetermined whether a = b, then it is uncertain what "a" refers to or what "b" refers to. - But this does not give us a reason to suppose that facts together with terms have to decide this. - Salmon just shows that when facts and terms do not decide that it is then indeterminate. --- I 140 StalnakerVsSalmon: its vagueness is a vagueness of reference. --- I 139 Identity/indefinite/Kripke: (1971, 50-1) E.g. would the table T be the same in the actual world if in the past the constituting molecules were spread a little differently? - Here, the answer can be vague. --- I 148 Identity/one-digit predicates/Stalnaker: one cannot generally treat sentences as predications. E.g. x^(Hx u Gx) is an instance of the form Fs, but "(Hs and Gs)" not. - ((s)> apply) - Therefore, our identity-scheme is more limited than Leibnizs' law is normally formulated. --- I 154f Definition essential identity/Stalnaker: all things x and y, which are identical, are essentially identical - i.e. identical in all possible worlds, in which this thing exists - ((s) that means, the existence is made a prerequisite, not the identity for the existence.) - ((s) necessary identity/Stalnaker/(s): here the situation is reversed: if x and y are necessarily identical, they must exist in all possible worlds - or if a thing does not exist in a possible world, it may, in the possible worlds in which it exists, not be necessarily identical) - necessary identity/logical form:. x^(x = y)> N(x = y) - fails in the standard semantics and in counterpart theory, because a thing can exist contingently and include self-identity existence - two different things may be identical, without being essentially identical. - E.g. two possible worlds a and b, each possible for the respective other, and two distinct things have the same counterpart in b, namely 3 - then the pair satisfies the identity-relation in b, but because 1 exists in the world a and is from 2 different, the pair does not satisfy N(Ex> x = y) in b. |
Sta I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |

> Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction | > Export as BibTeX file

Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-28