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Identity/Wessel: identity statement: Abbreviation of a statement about the importance of equality of two terms: mutual meaning inclusion - ta tb = definition (ta > tb) and (tb> ta) - but that is only correct for individual subject termini.
Identity/Hegel: a = a: E.g. Socrates is Socrates: demands that Socrates does not undergo any changes in time - WesselVsHegel: confusion of word and object - identity and difference two-digit predicates (relation) - not one-digit predicate. - x = y is existentially charged.
Identity/WesselVsLeibniz: suggests an incorrect comparison of separate objects.
Identity/logic/Wessel: x = x: existentially charged: only true if one thing x exists - not logically true, not a tautology, empirical fact (> Russell).
Definition identity/Wessel: i1 = i2 = definition S(i1, ti2). (s) S: the fact that i1 is designated by the name i2? - That a is designated with the name b? b stands for a? - Definition diversity/Wessel: -i (i1 = i2) = definition E(i1) u E(i2) ~ u (i1 = i2) - ((s), there are two expressions i1 and i2, which do not stand for the same object.) - identity/Wessel: we use the axiom: l- i1 = i2> ti 1 ti2. <((S) if the objects are identical, it follows that the corresponding expressions are equivalent in meaning.)
Identity/Science Logic/Wessel: 1) at any time is the object a identical with the object b in any spatial order with respect to any method for determining the order - 2) always, if one of a and b exists, the other also exists - structure must take into account the relations of objects - there is nothing in nature that justifies the preference for one or another relation (not a fact).
Identity in time/Science Logic/Wessel: if t2 after t1, one can no longer speak of identity - T1 and t2 are then only representative of the same class of objects a, if the objects were defined using time.
Logik Berlin 1999