Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Kripke, Saul Aaron
Books on Amazon
Identity Theory Frank I 32
Mental/Physical/Kripke/Frank: Teaches the diversity of the logical subjects of the physical and the psychic - I attribute the physical to a naturalistic vocabulary (syntactic structures), the mental to a mentalistic one (semantic structures).
Frank I 32
KripkeVsIdentity theory: will not go further than that an identity between syntactic and semantic structures would, if at all, be based on the fact that the semantic is not without the syntactic, but this does not sufficiently determine it through the syntactic - which is a variant of the supervenience thesis.
Frank I 114
KripkeVsIdentity theory: conceivable that a psychic event (e.g. pain) occurs without a physical event - hence the two are not identical - it is not an essential property of the sensation of pain to be a psychic event - it is rather only an accidental property.
Frank I 123
KripkeVsIdentity theory: it asserts a contingent identity - however, as it is necessary, we cannot speak of a deception if we try to imagine that the identity statement is false! - It could have turned out that pain is not C fiber stimulation: this is no analogy to heat/molecular motion - we pick out heat because of its contingent property that it feels a certain way - we pick out pain by the necessary property to feel like pain - KripkeVsLewis: causal role suggests the misconception that the cause of pain is contingent.

S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-28