Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Searle, John R.
Books on Amazon
Identity Theory I 54
KripkeVsIdentity Theory: if it was true that C-fiber stimulation is pain, then the identity would be necessary - such as the one from heat and molecular motion - but it does not seem to apply, that pain is necessarily a certain brain state - Kripke: objection of common sense (Butler): nothing mental can be equated with anything non-mental, without skipping the mental - SearleVsKripke: still dualist.
I 56
Token/Token-identity theory/(Lewis)/Searle: cannot say as a materialist, that the commonality of people who believe that Denver is the capital of Colorado, is precisely this intellectual property because the materialist denies this - solution: function of neurophysiological state.
I 56
SearleVsIdentity Theory: skips the mind - mind just there, and no problem at all. - LeibnizVsIdentity Theory: not all properties are identical: some are just physical, some mental.

J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-29