Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Searle, John R.
 
Books on Amazon
Identity Theory I 54
KripkeVsIdentity Theory: if it was true that C-fiber stimulation is pain, then the identity would be necessary - such as the one from heat and molecular motion - but it does not seem to apply, that pain is necessarily a certain brain state - Kripke: objection of common sense (Butler): nothing mental can be equated with anything non-mental, without skipping the mental - SearleVsKripke: still dualist.
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I 56
Token/Token-identity theory/(Lewis)/Searle: cannot say as a materialist, that the commonality of people who believe that Denver is the capital of Colorado, is precisely this intellectual property because the materialist denies this - solution: function of neurophysiological state.
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I 56
SearleVsIdentity Theory: skips the mind - mind just there, and no problem at all. - LeibnizVsIdentity Theory: not all properties are identical: some are just physical, some mental.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983


> Counter arguments against Searle
> Counter arguments in relation to Identity Theory



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-26