Books on Amazon
Individual/Lewis: can e.g. be the union of myself and all my counterparts - that is a mereological sum. - On the other hand: something else: a cross world individual that is a maximum counterpart-related sum of possible individuals, of whom I am one -> state of the world. - It’s only forbidden that an individual is entirely in several worlds - therefore there could be modal continuants. (Lewis ultimately Vs).
Schwarz I 60
Individual/Lewis/Schwarz/(s): points in time and space and space-time points are not individuals. - E.g. Leibniz: pointless, to imagine the whole world moved three feet to the left - E.g. ((s) if it was now 5 o’clock instead of 6 o’clock, it would only be a different name.) - If time was to be lost, then there would have to be other processes, which would not be affected by the "jump", then shifting of processes, not of points in time - ((s)> Davidson:> everything different). - ((s) pointless: this point in space is different-.) - only makes sense: this object is somewhere else, then show object, not point to point in room - pointless: this space-time point could have been different - makes sense: this object could have been somewhere else.
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989
Konventionen Berlin 1975
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005