Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Searle, John R.
 
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Content I 66f
Wide Content: causal relations to the world beyond the words so meanings are not in the head (Putnam pro, but not "wide content" (>Fodor).
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II 26f
Fulfillment of conditions: are fixed by propositional content - there is not a desire or belief without fulfillment conditions. (i.e. no regress).
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II 80
Deception: E.g. the moon is bigger on the horizon: that is part of the content. - Solution: if we had no beliefs, we would believe the moon had changed its size.
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II 87
Content/Searle: is not the same as object.
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II 196
Hallucination/Deception: brains in the vat have exactly the same intentional content.
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II 319
Intentional Content/Pierre Example/Searle: intentional content is sufficient, and that is different in "London is ugly" and "Londres est jolie" -Kripke: intentional content is not rigid, because descriptions are not rigid either - Names: neither equivalent to descriptions nor to intentional contents.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-28