Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Searle, John R.
Books on Amazon
Content I 66f
Wide Content: causal relations to the world beyond the words so meanings are not in the head (Putnam pro, but not "wide content" (>Fodor).
II 26f
Fulfillment of conditions: are fixed by propositional content - there is not a desire or belief without fulfillment conditions. (i.e. no regress).
- - -
II 80
Deception: E.g. the moon is bigger on the horizon: that is part of the content. - Solution: if we had no beliefs, we would believe the moon had changed its size.
II 87
Content/Searle: is not the same as object.
II 196
Hallucination/Deception: brains in the vat have exactly the same intentional content.
II 319
Intentional Content/Pierre Example/Searle: intentional content is sufficient, and that is different in "London is ugly" and "Londres est jolie" -Kripke: intentional content is not rigid, because descriptions are not rigid either - Names: neither equivalent to descriptions nor to intentional contents.

J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-25