Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Geach, Peter T.
 
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Intensions I 226
Meaning / Reference / Frege / Geach: his distinction is not the same as between intension / extension.
I 227
Term /Concepts/ Frege: purely extensional view - therefore no "sense of the name" - but reference of the predicate - ((s) Reference / (s): set of the mentioned items, = Extension). - but: Extension / Frege: object - Concept / Frege: no object - the reason for this is: a term is unsaturated, an object saturated - "red" does not stand a term - otherwise the term would be a name.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972


> Counter arguments against Geach
> Counter arguments in relation to Intensions



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-29