Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Stalnaker, Robert
Books on Amazon
Intensions I 16
Def C-intension/Jackson: is c(x) expressed by u in x. ((s) where the semantics in possible world x causes the content c to be expressed which is perhaps different from what can be meant by it in another possible world) - i.e. relative to possible worlds - Def A-intension/Jackson: solely determined by the idea of prop. ((s) what is meant?) (Regardless of possible worlds) - then difference between modal and epistemic distinctions. - There are no propositions that are both necessary and a posterori, and no propositions that are both contingent and a priori - but statements! - Def necessary a posteriori statement: is one with a necessary C-intension and a contingent A-intension - Def contingent a priori statement: is, on the other hand, one with a necessary A-intension and a contingent C-intension.
I 205
Def two-dimensional sentence intension/Stalnaker: a function with two arguments, a centered world and a possible world - its value is a truth value - Def A-intensions/primary intension/Primary sentence intension/Stalnaker: function with one argument, one centered world - its value is a truth value.
Def C-intension/Secondary intension/Secondary sentence intension/Stalnaker: function with one argument, one possible world - its value is a truth value.
I 208
Two-dimensional intension/Thought/Non-rigid/Content/Stalnaker: the two-dimensional intension for thoughts defines a non-rigid description of a proposition: the secondary intension is the reference of this description.
Secondary Proposition/Stalnaker: this proposition is not the content of the thoughts of the speaker, but is determined by the content, as a function of the facts.

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

> Counter arguments against Stalnaker
> Counter arguments in relation to Intensions

> Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction | > Export as BibTeX file
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-27