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|Intensional Objects||I 115
Defensive object/Cresswell: is an object which is a different thing (or several things) in different possible worlds (poss.w.) - Hintikka: better: game theory as a solution for identity in intensional contexts - whereby the first player tries, to make the proposition true, and the second to make it false - CresswellVsHintikka: the examples should be better understood in this way that they include normal quantification, but above entities of higher order, e.g. classes of individuals.
Intensional objects/Cresswell: a) new in every possible world - b) always from the actual world - CresswellVs: instead with Russell: predicate S: "is the largest wooden building" - then disambiguate: (13) (Ey) (x) ((Sx ⇔ x = y) ). Nfy) - ((s) There is only one most beautiful and that is necessary wooden) (14) N (Ey) (x) ((Sx ⇔ x = y).fy)-((s) There is neccessarily only one most beautiful and that is wooden (14), although both are wrong only (14) fails because the uniqueness of S is not logically guaranteed.
Solution: the following is true instead of (14): (15) (E1x) (Xs. N ((E1x) Sx> (Ey)(x)((Sx ⇔ x = y) . fy)) - N.B.: but the data of these variables are normal things, not intensional objects.
I, 122 ff
Intensional objects/Cresswell: Problem. E.g. (18) It is true in the other possible world that the largest wooden building of the southern hemisphere is wooden in the other world - (19) O (Ey)(x)((Sx ⇔ x = y) . Ofy) - (19) is not equivalent to (20) (Ey) (x) ((Sx ⇔ x = y) .fy) - because (19) is wrong in w1 because the thing that is the largest wooden building in w2 is not wooden in w1 - (20) is true, however, because the largest wooden building in any possible world is, of course, in this (s) same possible world wooden - Intensional object: according to this view we should treat the description "The largest wooden building of the southern hemisphere" as a name - then we must consider the form of (18) as (21) OOfs. - but OOfs is equivalent to fs, whatever an intensional object is attributed to s - therefore the meaning of (18) expressed by (19) cannot be captured by (21) - complex property: "in the other world wooden".
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984