Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Davidson, Donald
Books on Amazon
Intentionality II 65 et seq
Davidson: proper causal chains are necessary for intentionality.
II, 135 ff
The intentionalistic predicates are essentially normative.
Dav I 26
Intentional states/Davidson: analogy for measurement: are assumed, but not as entities (weight is not an entity for itself, but a property of the object) - intentions do not have to live in the brain as weights do not live in the object. They do not need to play a physiological role, just as numbers play no physical role. Therefore: if the subject does not find any entities here, it does not follow that it does not know what it thinks.
II 110
Davidson: proper causal chains are necessary for intentionality.

D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-28