Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Field, Hartry
Books on Amazon
Intentionality II 89
Intentionality/Language/Field: Language comes into play only when "believes that" is attributed. Thesis: serious behavioral attribution works without language.
II 100
Intentionality/FieldVsStalnaker: we need more than the atomistic approach that everything that suffices a Boolean algebra is sufficient for the explanation of mind states (by sets of possible worlds). - Instead: we need a systematic approach of content. - Therefore, we need a more fine-grained structure than that of sets of possible worlds.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-26