Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Fodor, Jerry
 
Books on Amazon
Intentionality Dennett I 599
Searle, Fodor: E.g. freezing (Dennett): this robot does not have a correct intentionality, only an as-if intentionality. Dennett: splitting hairs.
Fodor IV 14
Intentionality/Holism/Fodor/Lepore: Property T*: a belief only has it when it expresses a proposition that the content of one or another belief is by me. - E.g. if someone asks about a color, you will first think of red. - Problem: if we have biographically different thoughts, it may turn out that none of your thoughts has prop T* in relation to my thoughts. - Then only one of us could have thoughts about color and red. - Another problem: change of opinion and of beliefs could not be explained. - Vsintentional laws: Quine, Dennett, Davidson, Churchlands, Stich.
IV 127f
Belief not a basic concept in the theory of intentionality - instead: Representations.
IV 130
Intentional assignment: not limited by rationality, because representations may also be irrational (inconsistent) or fantastic - Fodor/Lepore Vs: that would be a change of subject, irrational propositional attitudes would be no intentional states - constitutive of faith: rationality: not at the same time that p and that not-p - but objects of intentional states may be contradictory.

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-25