|Searle, John R.
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|Intentionality||Dav II 112
SearleVsDavidson: suggests to distinguish two types of intentions:
a) "prior intentions" and
b) "intentions in action" intentional act only when the first, causes the second.
Dennett I 281
SearleVsDennett: "as-if intentionality".
Dennett II 67
Definition derived intentionality/Searle: limited form, that some of our art products have: e.g. words, sentences, books, maps, pictures, computer programs, etc. Their intentionality is only a loan from our mind. Shopping list, whether written or memorized. Likewise, mental pictures. Something internal, but still an art product.
Searle I 67
Intentionality biological, teleological: SearleVs: in case of confusion: words like "horse or cow" would be necessary.
Intentionality is normative: truth, consistency, rationality intrinsic - the Darwinian evolution is in contrast not normative.
Fulfilment conditions: intentional states represent their fulfilment conditions only under certain aspects that are important for the person concerned.
Intentional phenomena: Regulating consequences: genuine causal phenomena - Functional explanation: are only bare physical facts, causality only through interest-based description here - rules no cause of action.
Objects of intentionality need not to exist: (hope)
belief, fear, wishes, belief no record, one just has them.
Intentionality/fulfilment conditions/Searle: the mind gives the production of sounds intentionality, so that it gives the fulfilment conditions of the mental state to the production -> speech act - double level of intentionality: a) mental state - b) level of intention.
As-if intentionality/Searle: explains nothing, if there is no real intentionality. It has no causal power - SearleVsDennett: it is as empty as its "intentional attitude".
Graeser I 124
Intentionality/speech acts/Searle: action intentions have fulfilment conditions that are represented by them and by representing their fulfilment conditions, intended actions are ipso facto intentional - derived intentionality: physical realizations of speech acts are not intrinsically intentional as the propositional attitudes themselves.
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002