Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Searle, John R.
 
Books on Amazon
Intentionality Dav II 112
SearleVsDavidson: suggests to distinguish two types of intentions:
a) "prior intentions" and
b) "intentions in action" intentional act only when the first, causes the second.
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Dennett I 281
SearleVsDennett: "as-if intentionality".
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Dennett II 67
Definition derived intentionality/Searle: limited form, that some of our art products have: e.g. words, sentences, books, maps, pictures, computer programs, etc. Their intentionality is only a loan from our mind. Shopping list, whether written or memorized. Likewise, mental pictures. Something internal, but still an art product.
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Searle I 67
Intentionality biological, teleological: SearleVs: in case of confusion: words like "horse or cow" would be necessary.
Intentionality is normative: truth, consistency, rationality intrinsic - the Darwinian evolution is in contrast not normative.
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I 178
Fulfilment conditions: intentional states represent their fulfilment conditions only under certain aspects that are important for the person concerned.
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I 266F
Intentional phenomena: Regulating consequences: genuine causal phenomena - Functional explanation: are only bare physical facts, causality only through interest-based description here - rules no cause of action.
Objects of intentionality need not to exist: (hope)
belief, fear, wishes, belief no record, one just has them.
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II 208
Intentionality/fulfilment conditions/Searle: the mind gives the production of sounds intentionality, so that it gives the fulfilment conditions of the mental state to the production -> speech act - double level of intentionality: a) mental state - b) level of intention.
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III 156
As-if intentionality/Searle: explains nothing, if there is no real intentionality. It has no causal power - SearleVsDennett: it is as empty as its "intentional attitude".
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Graeser I 124
Intentionality/speech acts/Searle: action intentions have fulfilment conditions that are represented by them and by representing their fulfilment conditions, intended actions are ipso facto intentional - derived intentionality: physical realizations of speech acts are not intrinsically intentional as the propositional attitudes themselves.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002


> Counter arguments against Searle
> Counter arguments in relation to Intentionality



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-28