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|Internal Realism||Horwich I 389
Internal Realism/Putnam: empirical theory - collective spokesperson-behavior. - In contrast, metaphysical realism: not empirical, but a model. (like billiard balls).
Horwich I 400
Internal Realism/Putnam: how a theory "is understood" cannot be discussed within the theory itself. - Whether the theory has a clearly intended interpretation, has no absolute sense. - Metaphysical Realism: asks for a theory-independent fact in regards to what a term refers to within a theory. - internal realism: our use of "cow" assumes that "cow" is understood. - This works but only with a verificationist approach of understanding - not with a truth-conditional - hence the use is already explained.
Putnam I 18
Internal Realism/Putnam: (truth relative to a theory) - here use and reference are linked.
Internal Realism/PutnamVsDummett: related to its anti-Realism, but truth is not identified with justification but with an idealization of justification. - Quine: the justification conditions change with our corpus of knowledge.
Internal Realism/Putnam: the ontology is theory-dependent - truth: rationalized acceptability - brains in a vat are no possible world, because they are only assessable from God's perspective - observation through a "different world" is excluded by definition. - The internal realism recognizes an "internal conceptual scheme", within which objects exist. - Internalism: "Rabbit" refers just to rabbit.
ExternalismVs: the does not tell us what reference is. - Internalism: tautologies are sufficient for reference (> meaning postulates) causality irrelevant for reference. "Alien" refers to aliens - ExternalismVs: the meaning arises for us by association with "not from this earth" and that is ultimately causally mediated. - E.g. Natural type: basic concept for future horses.
InternalismVs "of the same kind" does not make sense out of a category system. - Everything is kind of the same kind-. There are no extra facts that make true that horses are horses, there are just horses. - VsInternalism: but so are self-identifying objects accepted (and the world arranges itself). - Putnam: ultimately, there are self-identifying objects, but not in the externalist sense. - Solution: objects are made and discovered - then they have intrinsic labels (but they are not mind-independent).
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994