Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Ryle, Gilbert
Books on Amazon
Introspection I 208f
Introspection/RyleVsIntrospection/Ryle: cannot be what the tradition expects of it as its object (object) is a myth. - Consciousness: what I can find out about me is of the same nature as what I can find out about others - the small differences just do not favor self-knowledge. - (RyleVsNagel)
I 216
RyleVsTradition: we do not encounter any symptoms inside - such events do not exist.
I 221 f
Introspection/RyleVsIntrospection/Ryle: there are no ghostly objects - but supposing there were, then regress: one would perceive then at the same time, that one perceives them. - Bad solution: then one would have to admit that there are imperceptible inner objects - a knowledge about it could not be based on introspection.

Ry I
G. Ryle
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-24